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NEWS FROM NowHERE: THE DEBASED DEBATE
ON CIVIL JUSTICE*
MARc GALANTER**

Public discussion of our civil justice system resounds with a litany of
quarter-truths: America is the most litigious society in the course of all
human history; Americans sue at the drop of a hat; the courts are brimming over with frivolous lawsuits; courts are a first rather than a last resort;
runaway juries make capricious awards to undeserving claimants; immense
punitive damage awards are routine; litigation is undermining our ability
to compete economically. Each of these is false, but in a complicated way;
so let me address this structure of myth, starting with some of the more
specific assertions and moving on to the sweeping generalities.
I.

Too MANY LAwYERs?

The first example is the assertion that the United States is home to
seventy percent of the world's lawyers. Dropped casually by Vice President
Quayle in his August 1991 speech to the American Bar Association (ABA),
it was parroted by President Bush, Cabinet members, members of Congress and media experts, and became a familiar factoid in the rhetoric of
the 1992 campaign.'
This is certainly an alarming figure. It suggests a monstrous deviation
from the rest of the world and insinuates that lawyers are a kind of cancerous excrescence on American society. As someone who has studied lawyers comparatively, I wondered how this percentage was determined.
Looking at the supporting Council on Competitiveness documents, I
* Copyright © 1993, Marc Galanter. The Martin P. Miller Centennial Lecture,
delivered at the University of Denver College of Law, October 2, 1992.
** Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, Director of the Institute
for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to Charles R Epp for
making available his work in progress, to J.T. Knight (University of Wisconsin Law School,
class of 1993) for able and dedicated research assistance, and to many colleagues who generously shared information and insights.
1. Vice President Dan Quayle, Address before the American Bar Association (transcript
available in Federal News Service, Aug. 13, 1991). In addition, Vice President Quayle's acceptance speech highlighted the 70 percent figure. ExcerptsFrom Vice President uayle'sAddress,
N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 21, 1992, atA15. Meanwhile the Republican Platform inexplicably reverted
to the predecessor two thirds figure. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. Whether this
item will outlive the political era that spawned it remains to be seen. In a post-election roundup for British readers, columnist George Will noted as one of "the nation's most pressing
problems... the suffocation of economic and social energies by regulations, and by litigation
from the 70 percent of the world's lawyers who are Americans." George F. Will, Clinton:If He
Succeeds, It Wldl BeDespiteHimself TiH DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 12,1992, at 17. More
recently, television news host Barbara Walters solemnly reported that "70 percent of all the
lawyers in the entire world are in this country." Nightline, Aug. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ABCNEW file.
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could find no sign of anything that could be called a calculation. 2 The
seventy percent figure seems to.be a retread of an item that surfaced a
decade ago, having no apparent terrestrial origin, that the United States
had two-thirds of the world's lawyers. 3 The two-thirds item was retailed by
ChiefJustice Burger as part of his indictment of litigious America.4 It was
subsequently used by Justice O'Connor and others, 5 and became part of
the speeches of Governor Lamm of Colorado about America's descent to
doom.6 After the round-up to seventy percent in 1991, 7 the two-thirds figure dropped out of use, apart from a reappearance in the Republican
Platform.8
Counting lawyers cross-nationally is a daunting undertaking, plagued
by poor data and a bushel of apples and oranges problems. 9 However
2. The President's Council on Competitiveness did not include the seventy-percent figure in its agenda [PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON CoMPETIvENEss, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUsTICE REFORM IN AlmEUcA, (1991) (hereinafter AGENDA)], but apparently there had been some
consideration of it in the preparation of the Vice President's August 13 speech, for a week
earlier "a Quayle spokesman" was reported as having "noted that the United States has 70
percent of the world's lawyers, and that the rising tide of litigation 'is a burden on our economy.'" Saundra Terry, Quayle ABA Speaker,WASH. PoSr, Aug. 12, 1991, at F5.
3. Among the earliest sightings were a newsmagazine report that "[tihe U.S. has
610,000 lawyers, two thirds of the world's total.... About 70 percent are in private practice."
Special Section: the ABCs ofjustice, U.S. Nms AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 1, 1982, at 55. [Could
this be the origin of the seventy percent figure?] A few months earlier, James Spensley, a
lecturer at the University of Denver Law School, was quoted as saying "The United States has
become the world's most litigious society, employing over two thirds of the world's lawyers."
David F. Salisbury, Colorado's Quality of Lffe Fades in a ChangingWest CHmsrirA SC. MON.,July
30, 1982, at 4. When I contacted Mr. Spensley on the telephone in January, 1992, he could
not recall the source of this information.
4. ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger, Annual Message on the Administration of'Justice at
the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, February 12, 1984, at 2. "It has been
reported that about two-thirds of all the lawyers in the world are in the United States and of
those, one-third have come into practice in the past five years." Id. A very similar item appeared a few months earlier in a contribution to Legal Times by New York lawyer Peter
Megargee Brown: "Two-thirds of all lawyers in the world are in the United States. One-third
of the lawyers in this country have been in practice less than five years." ProfessionEndangered
by Rush to Business Ethic, LEA. TmrEs, Sep. 23, 1983, at 10.
5. Milly McLean, SandraDay O'Connor. Some Advice for Young People, U.P.I., April 10,
1984. Cf Ernest Gellhorn, Too Much Law, Too Many Lauyers, Not EnoughJustie WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 1984, at 28 (a law school dean's op-ed reads "[t]wo-thirds of the world's lawyers now
practice in this country, and one-third of these were graduated during the past five years.").
6. E.g., John J. Sanko, Governor Addresses Businessmen, U.P.I., Nov. 3, 1983; Richard W.
Larsen, Time to Restore Logic to Public Policies, SEATrLE TrmEs, Oct. 14, 1990, at A18.
7. One failed bid for a yet higher portion was the attempt of a Reagan White House
staffer who proclaimed that "familiar" statistics showed that "[tihe United States has more
than 90 percent of the world's lawyers...." Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Young Must Lead In
Repair and Reform, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 18, 1986, at S-13.
8. The Vision Shared: Uniting OurFamily, Our County, Our World: The RepublicanPlatform
1992 75 (1992) [hereinafter Republican Platform]. A portent of renewed growth, combined
with a daring cosmological speculation, appeared in a letter to the editor "This country is
home to 75% of all the lawyers in the universe. There are more of them in one building in
Seattle than in all ofJapan." Mark Gorney, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 22, 1992, at A15.
9. The United States' "percentage of the world's lawyers" cannot be calculated meaningfully because legal professions in various countries are not exact counterparts of one another, but cousins more or less distant and bearing greater or lesser resemblance. See infra
note 10 (noting the difficulties of counting lawyers). Given these differences, there is no
single right answer to the "what percentage" question. Any answer must be based on some
explicit or tacit notion of who is to be counted. For example, one might adopt a formal
definition such as persons entitled to appear before the courts. But such a standard would
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these are resolved, it is clear that the seventy percent figure is very far from
the mark. An informed guess would be:something less than half of that.
Counting conservatively, American lawyers make up less than a third and

probably somewhere in the ,range of one-quarter of the world's lawyers,
using that term to refer to all those in jobs that American lawyers do (including judges, prosecutors, government lawyers and in-house corporate
lawyers) .10
eliminate English solicitors as well as most of the various sorts of practitioners inJapan, much
of whose work is similar to the work of American lawyers. We could, instead, adopt a functional definition. But those who are called lawyers perform many functions in some places
and few functions elsewhere. In the light of the purpose at hand, it seemed appropriate to
identify, as far as the sources permit, the counterparts of the broad, inclusive, multi-functional category of lawyer in the United States.

10. Although there are certainly defiiencies and gaps in the sources, it is possible to
assemble enough data of reasonable credibility to establish that the United States had no

more than thirty-five percent of the world's "lawyers" (defined in the inclusive American
style) and possibly as low as twenty-five percent or a bit less if complete information were
available. This is a rough calculation based upon an eclectic, common sense strategy of estimation, relying on a university library, on-line data services, and a network of acquaintances
familiar with legal professions in various countries., The results are presented in Appendix I.
Professor Ray August arrives at a much lower figure (9.4%) by extrapolating from
UNESCO figures on law student enrollments. The Mythical Kingdom of Lauyers, AB.A. J. 72
(Sept. 1992). But the portion of law students who graduate and the portion of graduates who
end up spending a lifetime providing legal services vary widely from country to country. To

ascertain the number of "law providers" would require detailed assessment of the linkages in
each country.
Professor August does not claim to have undertaken such an inquiry. Instead, he tells
us, he "'massaged' the [UNESCO] data statistically to determine how many 'law providers'...
there are in the world." The figures resulting from this process grossly overstate the "law
provider" population in many countries where we have reasonably reliable counts. In Germany, for example, his figure is almost twice as high as David Clark's estimate, which is based

on a count of all lawyers in private practice, notaries, judges, government lawyers, corporate
lawyers, and law teachers. David S. Clark, The Selection andAccountability ofJudges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaa4 61 S. CAL. L Ray. 1795, 1807-1808 (1988).
In many countries, the connection between law study and law practice is quite attenuated. For example, Professor August credits India (with whose legal system I have some familiarity) with the world's largest group of law providers, apparently over 800,000. This is more
than three times the number of enrolled advocates in India. Law colleges in India are plentiful and large numbers of white collar workers and unemployed youths attend evenings or
part time in order to obtain an additional credential. Many do not graduate. Of those who
do, many do not enroll as advocates. Few engage in legal work for their employers. Of those
enrolled advocates, an unknown but significant portion are eventually occupied otherwise
than as providers of legal services. In other countries, too, the figures generated by Professor
August's assumptions simply strain credibility. It takes considerable conceptual perseverance
to conclude that Uruguay has more than six times as many law providers per capita as the
United States. In this as in other cases, the totals appear to reflect the educational structures
of particular countries more than their occupational structures. The rankings derived from
these totals are, of course, vitiated by the same problems.
I The myth that the United States has most of the world's lawyers is a baseless fiction
promoted by people who should know better, many of whom probably do. By contrast, Professor August's estimate, arrived at systematically and conscientiously, does have a genuine
informational base. But unfortunately it is so deeply flawed that in the end his conclusion
that the United States has only nine percent of the world's lawyers, is no more worthy of
belief than the Vice President's seventy percent.
Notwithstanding their infirmities, the August figures were brandished by beleaguered
defenders of the civil justice system in the same credulous and uncritical way as the Quayle
seventy percent figure was used by those attacking it. "You all play fast and loose with the
facts. It's 9.8 percent." Bob Beckel, Crossfire (Cable News Network television broadcast, Aug.
27, 1992) (transcript #648). "In fact, the United Nations itself has a list of how many lawyers
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Is that too many?" It is roughly the United States's proportion of the
world's gross national product (GNP)12 and less than our percentage of
3
the world's expenditures on scientific research and development.'
America is a highly legalized society that relies on law and courts to do
many things that other industrial democracies do differently. 14 For a long
time the United States has supported far higher numbers of lawyers per
capita than nations with comparable economies. There is no reason to
think American lawyers are less efficient than their counterparts elsewhere, although it appears they are called upon to do more than lawyers
elsewhere. This is perhaps due to the dispersal of wealth, the fragmentation of authority, the absence of traditional elites or other reasons. In the
past generation the number of lawyers increased dramatically from
285,933 in 1960 to 655,191 in 1985-an increase of 129%. But this recent
growth is not a distinctly American phenomenon. The number of lawyers
has been increasing everywhere-in many places at a faster rate than in
the United States. For example, in the same period the number of lawyers
increased by 147% in England and by 253% in Canada,' 5 while the
number of private practitioners in Germany increased by 156%. 16
What is striking about the seventy percent figure is not that the estiare in each country. The United States falls behind on per capita lawyers-behind Japan,
behind Germany, behind France." Ralph Nader, News Conference with Coalition of Consumer
Groups, FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 2, 1992, at 4.
11. Even if we could count all the persons who go to work in the morning to provide
legal services, we would need to know more than the number of workers to ascertain the
portion of a nation's effort that is consumed in provision of legal services. And if we could
measure that, we would come up against profound differences in the ways that "legal service"
was defined in various countries and in the need or desire for law generated in different
societies.
12. The United States' GNP for 1985 was $4,215.7 billion, or 30.3% of the world's total
GNP for that year. WORLD TABLES 1992, 629.
13. The United States' expenditure on scientific research and development was $70 billion in 1980, or 56.9% of the $123.074 billion spent on scientific research and development
worldwide. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS, Fig. 0-1;
GEORGE THOMAS KURtAN, THE NEw BOOK OF WoRLn RANKINGS tbl. 299 (1984).
14. WERNER PFENNiS-TORF & DONALD G. GIrFORD, A COMPARATIVE SrUny OF LIABmrT
LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEmEs IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 129 (1991)

(hereinafter PFENNiGsTORF & GrORD) (less frequent resort to tort system in other industrialized democracies is due to presence of public entitlement systems or to public and private
insurance; these "alternative compensation sources do much of the work that is accomplished under the tort system in the United States." On the scantier coverage and lesser
coordination of American social security schemes, see John M. Grana, DisabilityAllowancesfor
Long-Term Carein Western Europe and the United States, 36 INT'L SOC. SEC. REV. 207 (1983); P.R.
KAIM-CAuDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL PoucY AND SOCIAL SECURiy (1973). Cf ALFRED KAHN,
SOCIAL SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE thl. 2.2 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. and Wel-

fare, 1976).
15. Marc Galanter, Law Abounding. Legalization Around the North Atlantic,55 MOD. L. Riv.
1, 4 (1992) (detailing the figures and sources on England and Canada).
16. See Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly RegulatedProfession, in 2 LAwYEs IN Soc=T. THE Civi. LAw WORLD 124, 150 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C.
Lewis eds. 1988) (increase in number of advocates from 18,347 in 1960 to 46,927 in 1985).
The increase in lawyers is not confined to the wealthiest countries. For example, the
number of lawyers in China multiplied many times over in the 1980s; from 1986 to 1990 it
more than doubled from 22,147 to 47,461. Hao Pan, Lawyers and Law Firms in Contemporaty
China-TowardaFramewor*ofInterpretation,7 (May 28-31, 1992) (Paper presented at the 1992
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Philadelphia).
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mate was so overblown, but that those who peddled it had reason to know
it was a tall tale' 7 and that neither Vice-President Quayle nor anyone else
who thought it was a relevant fact18 deemed it important to make an informed, rather than a wild, guess.
However, the United States' lawyer totals compare with those of
others, we do have more lawyers and many lament this condition. The
President's Council on Competitiveness deplored the "baleful effects" of
having too many lawyers. The principal intellectual foundation for the
view that lawyers hurt the economy is the work of University of Texas finance professor Stephen Magee. Magee has tried to show that the countries with the highest lawyer populations 19 suffer from impaired economic
growth. Magee's conclusion is wrong. His first version was shown to be
The best research on the topic
false 20 and his latest version is no stronger.
21
reaches entirely different conclusions.
In Magee's first take on this issue, he claimed that all lawyers are economically destructive. Apart from being silly on its face, that conclusion
resulted from an empirical analysis containing major methodological errors. His analysis compared the lawyer populations and economic growth
rates of 34 countries, and concluded that the more lawyers a country has,
the lower is its rate of growth.2 2 That analysis is shot through with
problems. First, Magee relied on poor lawyer data-his lawyer figures for
several countries were substantially incorrect. Second, he employed a peculiar research design that used lawyer data in 1983 to predict economic
growth from 1960 to 1985-even though his own figures showed that the
number of lawyers in 1983 bore little relation to the number in 1960.
Third, Magee's research did not take into account ("control for") any
17. The drafters of the Council's AGENDA had reason to know that seventy percent was a
falsehood. On page 1 of the AGENDA, there is an approving reference to, but no citation for,
"a recent report by a Professor of Finance at the University of Texas... estimated that the
average lawyer takes $1 million a year from the country's output of goods and services."
What the report referred to is Chapter 8 of Stephen P. Magee et al., BLACK HOLE TAurIS AND
ENDOGENOUS Poucy THEORY. POLrniCAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQummRM (1989).

That

source contains an incomplete listing of the number of lawyers in some 34 countries as of
1983. Even this inadequate enumeration showed American lawyers as just forty-five percent
of the total. One can conclude that the Council staff either did not examine the source they
approvingly cite or that they were aware that there was good reason to believe the seventy
percent figure was spurious.
18. Just a few weeks before he repeated the seventy percent figure in his speech accepting the vice presidential nomination, Vice-President Quayle brushed off criticism of its
accuracy with the ad hominem observation "Only those who benefit from the squandering of
litigation resources are attempting to calculate to the decimal the total costs of all lawsuits or
to determine whether Japan's scriveners should be counted in a census of the world's lawyers." Dan Quayle, Too Much Litigation: True Last Year, True Now, NAT'L L.J. 17 (Aug. 10,
1992).
19. In Magee's research, the lawyer population is measured as a ratio to either doctors
or white collar workers, which are both' taken to reflect the size of the productive work force
of a society.
20. Frank B. Cross, The Frst Thing WeDo, Let's KillAll the Economists:An EmpiricalEvaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and PoliticalSystem, 70 TEx. L Ray. 645
(1992).
21. Charles R Epp, Do Lauyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAw & Soc. INQURY 585
(1992); Cross, supranote 20.
22. STEPHEN P. MAGE Er Ar, supranote 17.
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other known influences on economic growth, including such powerful influences as a country's level of political instability. Finally, the conclusion
resulted in large part from the coincidence of low economic growth rates
and high lawyer populations in two "outliers" (Argentina and Nepal),
whose legal systems and economies bear little relation to our own.
After critics pointed out those failings, Magee refurbished his research, and now claims that only lawyers above a certain optimal number
hurt an economy.23 Stated that simply, the view has an intuitive plausibility: surely if all Americans were lawyers and did nothing else, our economy
would have problems. Magee's leap to the conclusion that there are, in
fact, too many lawyers in the United States is a different matter.
Like his first version, Magee's latest research is deeply flawed and
probably would not merit discussion were it not receiving so much publicity. In attempting to determine the economic effect of lawyers, he now
takes into account known influences on economic growth. But his conclusions still depend primarily on 1983 lawyer data for predicting prior economic growth, and they still rest on flawed lawyer data. For example, he
estimates that there are 43,100 lawyers in West Germany; but if we include
not only lawyers in private practice but also government lawyers, corporate
lawyers, judges and law teachers-all included in the United States lawyer
count-the total number of German lawyers in 1985 would have been
115,900.24 That produces a lawyer-to-white collar worker ratio of 29 per
thousand, not the 11 per thousand that Professor Magee asserts. Inaccuracies of that magnitude are not minor details. In his most recent response
to these criticisms, he declares that lawyer data corrected for such errors
still support his conclusion. 25 This is true, however, only if the lawyer data
are used to "predict" prior economic growth, an unjustifiable research
strategy. The same data contradict Magee's results when they are employed in analysis of subsequent economic growth.2 6 In addition, Magee's
latest conclusion, like his earlier one, rests on the coincidence of slow
growth and high lawyer populations in a few idiosyncratic countries, now
Uruguay and Chile.
As a corollary, Magee claims that lawyers have captured the United
States' political system, evidenced by the fact that forty-two percent of
United States Representatives and sixty-one percent of Senators are law23. According to Magee's calculations, the optimal number in 1983 was 23 lawyers per
1,000 white collar workers; the United States had about 38/1,000 in that year. Stephen
Magee, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at A17.
24. Clark, supra note 10, at table 1.
25. Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRy 667 (1992). In that article, Magee also presents statistical results using lawyer data
for a number of countries from 1975. Epp shows that those results are very tenuous, depending on one outlier (the United States); if that outlier is removed from the sample of countries, Magee's discovered relationship between lawyers and growth disappears-yet one
country cannot justifiably be used as the basis for statistical conclusions. Epp also shows that
Magee's 1975 lawyer data are largely Magee's own creation, and are "no better than a guess."
See Epp, supra note 21.
26. Epp, supranote 21; Charles R. Epp, Toward FutureResearch on Lawyers and Fconomic
Growth, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 695 (1992).
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yers. This hardly means, however, that the legal profession has captured
the political system: those lawyers in Congress are Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, proponents of regulation and enemies of
regulation. As a bloc, they share no discernible interest; a range of studies finds no difference between the voting patterns of lawyer-legislators
27
and those of nonlawyer-legislators.
Careful analyses of the effect of lawyers on the economy find no support for the Magee hypothesis; indeed, they find that lawyers have no significant effect at all on overall economic growth.2 8 The Magee analysis
rests on many of the familiar but unproven contentions about the civil
justice system. He assumes that the presence of "excess" lawyers is evidenced by the presence of "predatory" litigation, as distinguished from
justified or beneficial litigation. But he provides no evidence of the frequency of bad litigation independent of the conclusion that there are too
many lawyers.
II.

THE CoST OF THE L GAL SYSTEm

Another count in the indictment of the civil justice system is its excessive cost. Vice-President Quayle reported that "the legal system... now
costs Americans an estimated $300 billion a year. ... "29 This figure seems
to derive from the Agenda for CivilJusticeReform of the President's Council

on Competitiveness, which starts its accounting of litigation costs by
stating:
A recent article in Forbes estimates that individuals, business and
governments spend more than $80 billion a year on direct litigation costs and higher insurance premiums and a total of up to
$300 billion
indirectly, including the cost of efforts to avoid
0
liability3
Forbesdidn't actually conduct any analysis of its own: the authors of a story
on plaintiffs' lawyers cited publicist Peter Huber who, they recounted:
focused attention on the total 'tort tax' on the economy. Huber
estimates that individuals, businesses and governments pay at

least $80 billion a year directly, in such ways as litigation costs and
higher insurance premiums, and a total of $300
billion indirectly,
counting the cost of efforts to avoid liability.3 '
27. See Epp, supranote 21. The explanations for why we have so many lawyer-legislators
in the United States have little to do with lawyers' ostensible interest in "capture;" rather,

lawyers enter politics to a greater degree in the U.S. than elsewhere because in this country

political involvement helps lawyers' careers and because the structure of our party system
does not exclude entrepreneurial politicians (like lawyers) as do party systems in many other
countries. See id. for a survey of the research on lawyers in legislatures.
28. Epp, supra note 21; Cross, supra note 20.
29. Remarks by Vice-President Quayle at the American Business Conference, Oct. 1,
1991, FED. NEws SERv. The same figure reappears in the Fact Sheet, Access to JusticeAct, 1992,
Office of the Press Secretary (Feb. 4, 1992).
30. AGENDA, supra note 2, at 1.
31. Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The PlaintiffAttorneys' Great Honey Rush, FoRBms,
OCt. 16, 1989. An earlier Forbesstory had cited the eighty billion figure as including indirect
as well as direct costs. The president of the Defense Research Institute was reported as noting
that
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Huber proffered these figures in his 1988 book in the course of equating
tort liability with a
tax [that] directly costs American individuals, businesses, municipalities and other government bodies at least $80 billion a year, a
figure that equals the total profits of the country's top 200 corporations. But many of the tax's costs are indirect and unmeasurable.... The extent of these indirect costs can only be
guessed at. One study concluded that doctors spend $3.50 in efforts to avoid additional charges for each $1 of direct tax they
pay. If similar multipliers operate in other areas, the tax's hidden
impact on the way we live and do business may amount to a three
32
hundred billion dollar annual levy on the American economy.
Huber's eighty billion figure is considerably higher than several systematic
estimates of tort costs published in the years preceding the appearance of
his book.3 3 (These in turn have been often misrepresented by partisans
experts estimate that the total costs associated with tort liability exceed $80 billion
annually. These costs include not only lawyers' fees, court costs and damage awards
but also the much greater amount of money that corporations and individuals invest in efforts to avoid being dragged into court in the first place.
Ronald Bailey, Mr. Tort Reform, FoRsES, Dec. 12, 1988, at 276.
32. PE=ER W. HUBER, IrABurrJ.
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4
(1988).
33. For the most prominent of these, seeJAmS S. KAxAUK & NICHoLAS M. PACE, CosTs
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LmGATON (1986). The authors conclude that total expenditures for all tort litigation terminated in 1985 was between $29 and $36 billion, including "compensation paid to plaintiffs, legal fees and related expenses for both plaintiffs and
defendants, insurance company claims-processing costs for claims in suit, the value of litigants' time spent, and the costs of operating the court system for these cases." Id. at vi-vii. It
should be noted that this estimate includes only claims in which suit was filed in a court of
general jurisdiction. The authors estimate compensation paid in tort claims in courts of
limited jurisdiction was $1.8 billion, not counting legal fees and expenses. They report that
"[c]ompensation paid on liability claims that did not involve lawsuits was an estimated $22
billion in 1985." Id. at 66.
Another study estimates the amount paid to claimants by the tort system (which would
include most of plaintiffs' costs, but not those of defendants or courts) in 1984 at $39 billion,
plus non-automobile self-insurance costs which were not calculated. Since it includes all payments, notjust those in lawsuits in courts of general jurisdiction, the addition of the missing
costs would bring this in the vicinity of the ICJ figures. Jeffrey O'Connell &James Guinivan,
An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss
Insurance,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 759 (1988). This may have appeared too late to have come to
Huber's attention before the publication of his 1988 book. A year earlier, the senior author
of this study published a comparable estimate of tort system payouts of $31.3 billion for 1982.
Jeffrey O'Connell & Jay Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the ConardMorgan Tabulations,47 Omo ST. L.J. 913, 921 (1986).
A contemporaneous study by two New York University economists estimated that the
administrative costs of the tort system in 1984 were somewhere between $15 and $20 billion,
very close to Kakalik and Pace's estimate of $16 to $19 billion. ANnanw SCHOTTER &JANUsz
ORDOVER, THE COST OF THE TORT SysrEm (1986).
A study of tort costs by a leading actuarial consulting firm, commissioned by the American Insurance Association, estimated the costs of the system in 1984 as $66.5 billion. ROBERT
W. STURis, THE Cosr OF Tm U.S. TORT Svsim 22 (1985) (Updated and expanded versions
of this compilation were issued by Tillinghast with no author listed. See infra note 42.)
In response to critical assessment of his research practices, Huber has disavowed the
Malott quote as the source of the $80 billion figure, contending that when researching Liabilityin 1987 he "had before [him]" two articles from the Wall StreetJournal one from the Economist; one from Forbes, all dated 1986, and the Scotter-Ordover study. Peter Huber, Huber
Responds, Letter to the Editor, TEXAS LAw., Feb. 8, 1993, at 2. One of these Wall StreetJournal

1993]

NEWS FROM NOWHERE

eager to minimize the costs of the system.) 3 4
Huber does not report any investigation or analysis of his own. Instead, he cites two sources. For the eighty billion direct cost figure he gives
a citation to Chief Executive magazine that turns out to be a round table
discussion among executives. In the course of that discussion, Robert Malott, chairman and CEO of FMC, and a prominent Republican fundraiser
and the Business Roundtable's "point man on product liability,"35 devoted
a single sentence to the magnitude of liability costs:
It's estimated that insurance liability costs industry about $80 billion a year, roughly the equivalent of the profitability of the top
of liability lawsuits has
200 corporations in the U.S. The number
36
risen over 10 years by 600 percent.
articles (Stephen Wermiel, The Costs of Lawsuits, GrowingEverLarger,Disrupt the Economy, WALL
ST. J., May 16, 1986, p. 1, col. 6) and the Forbes article (just The Facts,Please,FORBES, Oct. 27,
1986, at 10) cite the Sturgis [Tillinghast] study's figure of $66.5 billion as the cost of liability
insurance in 1984. The other two (David B. Hilder, Insurers'Pushto Limit CivilDamageAwards
Begins to Slow Down, WALL ST.J., August 1, 1986, p. 1, col. 6; The guilty partiesin the great liability
insurance crisis, THE EcoNosssr, Mar. 22, 1986, at 23) refer to $70 billion as the previous
year's cost of resolving liability claims (possibly a very different number). Although these
numbers seem to derive from the Sturgis figure, there is no specification of a source or
indication of what is included.
Anti-litigation publicist Walter Olson, in defense of Huber, insists that "[t]he $80 billion
figure... came from the widely publicized Tillinghast/Towers Perrin studies" which he attests "had been widely if not universally reported in the press .... " Walter Olson, Defending
Huber, Letter to the Editor, TEXAS LAw., Feb. 8, 1993, at 2. As indicated in note 42 infra,
there never was a Tillinghast $80 billion dollar figure.
Whatever was "before" Huber at the time, there is no indication in his book that he
examined any of the then extant sources: Kakalik and Pace, Sturgis [Tillinghast], O'Connell
and Barker, Schotter and Ordover. The last word is likely to remain Huber's observation that
"[a]ny half-competent student of tort liability in 1987 knew that liability insurance costs were
then running somewhere in the $80 billion range." Huber, supra, at 2. Huber's citation
practices are addressed at length in Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber'sJunk
Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993).
34. Typically this is done by presenting the Rand estimate for the cost of litigated cases
as the cost of the whole system. Tom Gibbins, PropositionsBuilt on Myth, NAT'L L J. 17-18
(Oct. 7,1991);Jamie S. Gorelick, A ProfessionunderAttackfrom Without and Within, WASH. LAW.
6 (Sep.-Oct., 1992); Mark Green, Bush and Quayle's 'LegalReform:'A Hoax,NEWSDAY, OCt. 14,
1992, at 87.
35. Paul Merrion, FreshFacesAnimate GOPFund-Raising,CRArN's Cm. Bus., Aug. 15, 1988
(fund-raising); John S. Mclenahen, Whatever Happened to The Corporate Statesman? Irmus.
Wx., Nov. 6, 1989, at 55 ("point man").
36. How Do You Cope When Coverage is Unaffordable or Unavailable,CHIEF ExucutrvE (Summer 1986). No source or basis for this "estimate" is provided. From the context, it is unclear
whether Mr. Malott is presenting this as the cost of product liability or of the entire tort
system. The reference to a 600% increase of"liability lawsuits," echoing then-prevalent alarm
about the rising number of product liability cases filed in the federal courts, suggests that it
was product liability that he had in mind, not all tort cases.
Whatever its source, the figure must have come to Mr. Malott's attention not long before
the round table, for the published version of a talk delivered Oct. 10, 1985, at Northwestern
University Law School's Corporate Counsel Institute on "America's Liability Explosion: Can
We Afford the Cost?" contains no estimate of overall costs.
One possible source of Mr. Malott's figure is the estimate of tort system costs in an
address by Robert W. Sturgis of Tillinghast, Nelson and Warren, a leading actuarial consulting firm, to the Annual Meeting of the American Insurance Association in Chicago (Nov. 14,
1985). Reporting the results of a study commissioned by the Association, Mr. Sturgis estimated the costs of the tort system in 1984 at 66.5 billion. ROBERT W. STUaGS, THE COST OF
THE U.S. TORT SvswM 22 (1985). "Eighty billion" might represent a bit of rounding up for
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The eighty billion figure has enjoyed continuing use, often linked
with the nugget, which Huber tsakes from Malott, about the profits of the
two hundred largest corporations. It appears prominently in a long-running advertisement by the American International Group insurance companies, entitled "Why reforming our liability system is essential if America
is to succeed in overseas markets."31 Some temporal elaboration is offered
by Susan Engeleiter, then Administrator of the Small Business Administration, in a 1990 op-ed piece that reports "[e]xperts estimate that the total
cost of product liability lawsuits between 1973 and 1988 was $80 billion
each year-a sum equal to the combined profits of the 200 largest corporations in the United States."38 In this branch of the eighty billion tradition, it is put forward as the cost of product liability, while Huber takes
that amount as the cost of the entire tort system.
For the move from eighty to three hundred billion, Huber multiplies
eighty billion by three and half - and rounds up. The three and half
multiplier is taken from an editorial in the Journalof the American Medical
Association that refers to a study of practice changes attributed to malpractice by physicians surveyed in 1984.39 Thus Huber's "estimate" consists of
multiplying the undocumented surmise of Mr. Malott by the ratio of physician-reported changes to malpractice insurance premiums. There is no
discussion of the representativeness of this species of liability, of this seg40
ment of time, or of the suitability of this measure.
Even though Malott (and following him, AIG and Engeleiter) appears
growth during the intervening year and a half. But it is dear that the Sturgis figure is for the
entire tort system, notjust product liability.
37. The earliest of these in my possession is from the N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 25, 1990 ...
it
has been estimated that this hidden [liability] tax amounts to $80 billion a year-a sum equal
to the combined profits of the nation's 200 largest corporations.") The same text is found in
a version that appeared in THE NEW YoaRxa, Feb. 10, 1992, at 54-55. An earlier AIG advertisement approvingly cites Huber's book, suggesting the possibility that the $80 billion figure
may have been borrowed from that source. The Liability Lotty: We All Lose, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 1989, at A12-A13.
38. Product Liability Laws: The Economy is the Victim, Says Small Business Administration's
Engeleiter,PR NsvswmE, Dateline: WashingtonJuly 24, 1990, in WASH. TrmEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at
F3; METALWORmNG NEws, Aug. 13, 1990, at 15. So far no reformer has seized the opportunity
offered by Ms. Engeleiter to escalate the costs of product liability alone over the trillion mark
(16 years x 80 billion = 1.28 trillion).
39. Jeffrey E. Harris, Defensive Medicine: It Costs, but Does it Work, 257JAMA 2801 (1987).
The editorial refers to a study that finds that physicians who reported an average increase of
$1300 to $8400 in the cost of their malpractice insurance also "reported changes in their
medical practices that were worth an additional $4600 per physician per year." From this
finding the authors of the study calculated that "each $1 of malpractice risk-as gauged by
insurance premiums-induces $3.50 in defensive medicine expenditures." Id.; see Roger A.
Reynolds et a4 The Cost of Medical ProfessionalLiability, 257JAMA 2776 (1987).
40. For some of the implausible assumptions built into Huber's unexplained multiplier
move, see Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents:A Response to Huber,42 STAN.
L. Rzv. 539, 549-50 (1990). When the President of the American Bar Association cited the
Hager article, Huber berated him for relying "on an obscure 1990 law review piece that
extols the virtues of health care in Cuba, quotes Karl Marx with grave respect, and, oh yes,
heatedly attacks my book." Peter Huber, Dan Quayle, the Lawoyers and the AIDS Babies, FoRams,
Oct. 28, 1991, at 194. The relevance of Huber's response may be judged by noting that the
reference to the achievement of high life expectancies in Cuba takes up nine lines in a fortyone page review. The respectful quotation of Marx consists of two lines containing the famous aphorism that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.
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to have addressed the costs of product liability, Huber adopted his figure as

an estimate of the direct cost of all tort litigation. When the estimate, if
that is the term, was adopted by the Forbes writers it was as the cost of all
torts. The Council on Competitiveness and Vice-President Quayle, who

purported to address the entire civil justice system, present these borrowed figures as the cost of all civil litigationto the United States economy.
Finally the Republican Platform adopted "$300 billion a year" as the cost
of "our legal system." 4 1 Proponents of these wider usages never indicate

whether they scaled down Huber's tort estimate (or Malott's product liability estimate) to make room for the costs of the far more numerous nontort cases and many non-litigation parts of the legal system or whether they

concluded that non-tort litigation and non-litigation is costless. Indeed,
the Vice-President and the White House compressed Huber's eighty billion of direct costs and three hundred billion of indirect costs for torts

alone into a total cost of three hundred billion for the whole legal
system. 4 2
In the heat of the 1992 presidential campaign, a year after Vice-President Quayle's address to the ABA, a new cost figure was projected into the
national debate. In the midst of a discussion of "our crazy, out of control
legal system" that focussed on mounting and burdensome litigation, President Bush referred to a new study by the National Association of Manufacturers, reporting that "American consumers and companies will spend up
41. RepublicanPlatform, supra note 8, at 76.

42. See supranote 1 and accompanying text. Huber was proud to acknowledge paternity
of the Vice President's $80 billion dollar figure. A few months after Quayle's speech, he wrote
that the "spat" between Vice-President Quayle and ABA President D'Alemberte about tort
costs "apparently derives from a number noted briefly in my 1988 book Liability." Peter Huber, Dan Quayle, the Lawyers and the AIDS Babies, FoRBEs, Oct. 28, 1991, at 194. But a subsequent Forbesarticle, by one of the authors of the 1989 article that cited him, announced a
revised genealogy for its $80 billion figure that omits Huber. Now "[t] hat figure was based on
a study by Tillinghast, a Hartford-based actuarial consulting company." Leslie Spencer, The
Tort Tax, FoRBEs, Feb. 17, 1992, at 40. Spencer notes that this figure "represented lawyers'
fees, payouts to claimants and insurers' administrative costs in 1985." But the 1989 article
never referred to Tillinghast and specifically credited the figure to Huber, who makes no
mention of Tillinghast in the references to his book. An earlier Forbes story had noted the
Tillinghast estimate, which it gave as $68 billion, for 1984. Just,the Facts,Please FoRBEs, Oct.
27, 1986, at 10. The $80 billion figure, however, does not correspond closely to any annual
figure published by Tillinghast. See Sturgis, supra note 33, at 22. Tillinghast estimates for the
cost of the tort system are:
1984 .........................................$66.3 billion
1985 .........................................$89.2
1986 ....................................... $108.4
1987 ....................................... $117.0
Tillighast, Tort Cost Trends: An InternationalPerspective 1989, at A4. These were the most up-todate figures published by Tillinghast prior to the release in October, 1992 of its further update, entitled Tort Cost Trends: An InternationalPerspective 1992 [hereinafter Tillinghast 1992).
That publication revised and extended the earlier estimates as follows:
1984 .........................................$66.0 billion
1985 .........................................$87.2
1986 ....................................... $105.2
1987 ....................................... $112.4
1988 ....................................... $115.5
1989 ....................................... $122.9
1990 ....................................... $130.5
1991 ....................................... $132.2
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to 200 billion dollars on legal services this year-200 billion dollars." This
figure was introduced as revealing "what this litigation explosion costs our
43
economy."
Two hundred billion as the cost of litigating lawyers would presumably escalate total direct costs far beyond the eighty billion or even the
three hundred billion that figured in earlier estimates. The Presidential
conflation of lawyer costs with litigation costs is understandable since the
NAM report is misleadingly entitled The Cost of Litigation 44 The report is
based on Department of Commerce data on expenditures on lawyers' services. Most of the direct cost of litigation is the cost of lawyers, but it does
not follow that most of the spending on lawyers is for litigation.4 5 No one
knows just what portion of these expenditures on legal services are connected with litigation. 4 6 It is surely less than all and probably far less than
most. In any event, the NAM document makes no attempt to distinguish
litigation costs from other legal costs. Even as an estimate of total legal
services costs for 1992, the NAM's $200 billion figure is deeply problematic. Its largest component is a rather precarious projection from the Department of Commerce's 1982 and 1987 figures; 4 7 and those figures seem
48
to have been misread.
43. President George Bush, remarks at a Labor Day Picnic in Waukesha, Wisconsin
(Sept. 7, 1992) FED. NEws SERv. [hereinafter Labor Day].
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACruRERS, THE Cosr OF LITIGATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE WrrH SELECT BMUOGRAPHY, (1992) [hereinafter NAM].

45. See the Civil Litigation Research Project's study of "ordinary" litigation, "[flees paid
to lawyers (including expenses charged) make up 99% of the out-of-pocket costs in the median case for individual clients, and 98% in the median case for organizations." DAVID M.
TRUBEK Er AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT Pt. A, 11-9.
46. Some legal costs are not included in these Department of Commerce figures such as
the cost of in-house counsel, some of whose expertise is attributable to litigation.
47. Based on Department of Commerce's Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United
States, the NAM estimates that in 1992, consumers will spend $53.4 billion legal services and
that business will spend an additional $148.1 billion, for a grand total of $201.5 billion. See
NAM, supra note 44, at 8-12.
The estimate of business spending is a projection from 1982 and 1987 figures. It is based
on the assumption that business spending increased at the same rate in 1987-92 as in the
previous five year period. This is problematic, for consumer spending, which business spending closely tracked in the first period, increased at a much lower rate over the second period.
(We know this because the consumer expenditures are reported annually, while the business
expenditures are reported only at five year intervals.) For this reason, NAM provided a second estimate of business expenditures of $110 billion, based on the known rate of increase of
consumer spending over the second period, which would reduce the total to $163.4 billion
for 1992.

48. Even NAM's revised estimate is suspect because it appears that in reading the tables
on expenditures for 1982 and (possibly) 1987, NAM inflated the total of business expenditures by double-counting personal expenditures. NAM, supra note 44. In 1982 the Department of Commerce's Table 3 (The Use Table for Commodities), which lists the value of
commodities and the industries that use them, reports the totalvalue of commodity 73.0301
[legal services] as $39.421 billion. U.S. DMARTsmENr OF COMMERCE, THE 1982 BENCHMARK INptrr-Otrrptrr Accou-rs OF THE UNrr.D STATES tbl. 3, 180 (1991)

[hereinafter BENCHMARK].

This total is then broken down, "using industry" by "using industry." Among the list of users is
91.0000 [personal consumption], which is listed as using legal services valued at $18.3706
billion. Id. at 181. This corresponds to the $18.4 billion reported by NAM as Personal Consumption SpendingforLegalSevicesin 1982. NAM, supranote 44, at tbl. 1. NAM reports business
expenditures on legal services for 1982 of $38.3 billion, although according to the Benchmark table, the totalvalue of legal services in that year was $39.4 billion. See id., at 12. Appar-
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Quite apart from their origin in conjecture and the vacillation about
just what is being measured, most "cost of litigation" figures have two
deeper and more significant flaws. First, they conflate costs and transfers.
A significant portion of the wealth that flows through the litigation system
is compensation delivered to creditors and wronged parties to which they
are entitled under the going rules.4 9 This half (or more) of the supposed
cost is a cost to defendants, but it is not a cost of the system or a cost to the
country, for the wealth is not lost but only transferred to different hands.
That it costs so much to effectuate these rightful transfers is a scandalbut controlling these transaction costs should not be confounded with reducing the rights of claimants. Second, they talk about costs in isolation
from benefits. 50 Our accounts should reflect not only the costs but the
benefits of enforcing such transfers, which afford vindication, induce investments in safety, and deter undesirable behavior. For instance, the
sums transferred by successful patent infringement litigation are not only
not lost, but maintain the credibility of the patent system which in turn
creates powerful incentives. To put forward estimates of gross costs-even
ones that are not make-believe-as a guide to policy displays indifference
to the vital functions that the law performs. America's institutions of remedy and accountability and the lawyers that staff them are portrayed as
burdensome afflictions. They are viewed as costs and thus as deadweight
losses.
In connection with this second point, it should be noted that the costs
ently in arriving at its estimate of business expenditures, NAM omitted to remove personal
consumption expenditures from the total, thus greatly overestimating business expenditures
in that year.
Once this is corrected, the otherwise anomalous NAM totals accord roughly with published Census data on the receipts of the legal services industry, which listed total receipts in
1982 of $34.325 billion, of which $15.270 billion was received from individuals and $16.699
billion was received from businesses. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU oF THE CENsOs, CENsus OF SERVICE INDUnSmrs: LEcAL SER ICES, 1982 Table 30.
I am not in a position to perform a similar analysis of the 1987 data since these are not
yet published. NAM reports that it relied upon preliminary estimates obtained from the
Commerce Department. See NAM, supranote 44, at 11-12.
If we reduce the totals to eliminate the double-counting, business expenditure on legal
services in 1992 would be some $62 billion rather than the $110 billion projected by the

NAM (on the assumption that growth tracked the growth of consumer expenditures) and the
total expenditure on legal services would be $115 billion instead of $163 billion.
49. The Institute for Civil Justice estimated that the net compensation to plaintiffs in
tort cases in 1985 was roughly half of the dollars spent on tort litigation. But the portion
received by plaintiffs varied with the type of litigation: it was fifty-two percent in automobile
torts, forty-three percent in non-automobile torts, and only thirty-seven percent in asbestos
cases. DEBORAH R. HENs=rm Er Ai., TRFDs iN TORT LrGATION: THE STORY BEHiND THE STATIsTcS 29 (1987). I know of no data about the ratio of recoveries to total expenditures in
non-tort litigation.
50. Thus, Huber labels the gross cost of the tort system a "tax" and implies that it is a
deadweight loss. In contrast, both the Harris editorial and the original Reynolds study (the
sources of his indirect cost estimate) acknowledge that there are medical benefits or deterrence effects of these additional expenditures that remain unmeasured. Similarly, Robert
Sturgis, the source of the Tillinghast estimates of tort costs, reminds his audience that "we
have settled upon a definition of gross cost without regard for the social and economic benefits that may be derived from the system." Robert W. Sturgis, Address before the American
Insurance Association (Nov. 14, 1985).
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attributable to present institutional arrangements are made to loom menacingly large by ignoring the costs of alternative arrangements for obtaining equivalent benefits. For example, if we were to forego the tort
system's contribution to accident prevention, presumably people and businesses would make other expenditures to prevent and minimize injury.
The savings from completely abolishing the tort system would not be all
the billions that flow through it-nor even all the billions spent on it, but
only that increment beyond what would be spent on the alternative means
of protection. So a genuine assessment of the legal system would have to
consider not only its costs, but the benefits it produces and the cost of
producing such benefits by alternative means.51
Sadly, the discourse about the cost of litigation is as flawed as the
discourse about the abundance of lawyers. Each is marked by an utterly
cavalier treatment of facts, a use of sources that would shame any first year
law student, and an absence of any serious attempt to make a disciplined
assessment of what is going on in the world.
III.

THE COMPETrVENESS CHARGE

Many nasty effects have been attributed to lawyers and litigation. Earlier critiques of the civil justice system focussed on the erosion of community, the decline of self-reliance, the atrophy of informal self-regulatory
mechanisms, and the fostering of a corrosive adversary culture.5 2 In the
latest round, these have been eclipsed by concern that the civil justice system is undermining the country's economic performance. The Vice-President's engagement with civil justice emerged from his leadership of the
President's Council on Competitiveness. Although that Council's Agenda
and its polemical progeny spoke of litigation in broad terms, it is product
liability litigation that is the essence and model of the problem. As President Bush recently put it, "[o]ur product liability system is killing our economic competitiveness ....

53 Escalating product liability litigation is

blamed for undermining competitiveness by raising costs, diverting investment, and discouraging innovation. That product liability litigation is increasing inexorably, driven by the greed of entrepreneurial lawyers, the
wrongheadedness of activistjudges, and the rising litigiousness of ordinary
Americans is a key count in the indictment of America's civil justice
system.
Figure One displays the number of personal injury product liability
filings each year from 1985 to 1991 (the last year for which published information is available.) 54 The total is broken down into asbestos cases and
51. Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theoy, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990) (comparative institutional analysis); cf. Peter L. Kahn, Pricingthe U.S.
Legal System, CnusrtA ScI. MoN., Sept. 11, 1992, at 19.
52. For a catalog of these charges, see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDiputes:
What We Know and Don'tKnow (and Think We Know) About OurAllegedly Contentiousand Litigious
Society, 31 U.C.LA. L. REv. 4 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
53. See Labor Day, supranote 43.
54. All years referred to are Statistical years used by the Administrative Office of the
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all other product liability cases. Figure One presents a massive surge in
asbestos filings accounting for all of the increase in filings in the product
liability category. Indeed, if we look at the remainder, which includes
cases involving every other product save this one, we find that the total of
non-asbestos products liability filings has shrunk from 8268 in 1985 to
5263 in 1991-a decrease of thirty-six percent.
Is it legitimate to "put aside" asbestos cases? Asbestos litigation is a
painful problem that displays much of the worst about our system of litigation-high costs, repetitive litigation, severe delays, and inconsistent
awards. Asbestos litigation presents a problem of assuring justice to victims (and to their injurers). It also presents a problem of congestion in
many courts. But each of these-the justice problem and the congestion
problem-is quite distinct from the supposed problem of excessive product liability litigation debilitating the American economy.
Asbestos cases are a distinctive population of cases. For the most part,
these cases deal with events that happened decades ago. They are typically
complicated by the presence of multiple defendants-about twenty in the
typical case. They arose from the use of a product of unparalleled deadliness, to which there was massive exposure that continued long after the
dangers of its use were suspected. As a report from the Federal Judicial
Center put it:
During a period of increasing use, asbestos manufacturers suppressed knowledge about the dangers of exposure to asbestos fibers. The result was a further accumulation of potential cases
and a factual foundation for punitive damages. A by-product of
suppression of unfavorable information was that companies
failed to improve safety standards and communicate warnings
that might have mitigated the dangers ....- 55
The report concludes that the convergence of these factors made asbestos
litigation unique with "no historic analogues and no projected recurrence
of similar phenomena." 56 Eventually, there will be no more asbestos cases,
as the pool of victims is depleted. This is due first to the deadly effects of
asbestos, and secondly to the powerful preventive effects produced by the
asbestos litigation. No one can say that we cannot have another such epidemic about another product. But if we did it too would be distinct from
the pattern of ordinary product liability litigation. It would have no effect
on the fortunes of the companies that make the tens of thousands of other
products.
If we turn to those other companies, it would appear that they have
experienced a significant decrease in their exposure to product liability
cases. 57 It is possible, of course, that product liability claims increased
Courts, ending on June 30th of the named year. The choice of 1985 is dictated by the fact
that it was the first full year in which asbestos cases were counted separately from other
product liability cases.
55. THOMAS E. Wiu.crNc, FEDERA.JunIciAL CENTER, TRa ms IN AsBsros LrrrAMroN xi
(1987).
56. Id. at xii.
57. Of course, such exposure is not spread evenly across all companies. Product liability
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Product Liability Filings, Asbestos and Non-Asbestos
Federal District Courts 1985-1991
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even while case filings decreased-because more claims are paid without
the filing of a lawsuit or because larger numbers of claims are combined
into single filings. But those who point to the burden of product liability
law have provided no evidence that either of these eventualities has occurred. 58 It might be objected that our figures are only for filing in federal courts. It is well known that the vast majority of civil cases are brought
in state courts. The federal court data is not necessarily representative of
trends in the state courts, where the great bulk of cases are brought.
No one knows the total amount of product liability litigation in the
state courts. Only a handful of states count these cases separately on a
regular basis. There is some scattered evidence, however, from which we
can derive a rough sense of the presence of product liability claims in the
state courts. We do know that product liability is much less prominent in
state court dockets than in the federal courts. Several studies suggest that
cases are highly concentrated in a small number of industries. An Institute of Civil Justice
study identified the first named defendant in all of the product cases filed in federal court
from 1974 to 1986. Eighty companies were the defendants in half of those cases: the defendants in the other half were some nineteen thousand companies. T. DuNWORTH, PRODUCr
LimLrr AmD THE BusINFss SECTOR: LinGATioN TRENDs uN FEDERAL COURT 25 (1988).
Dunworth notes that similar concentration is present in non-asbestos suits as well as asbestos.
Id. at 26. Within industries, there was a significant degree of concentration in the motor
vehicle and pharmaceutical/health product industries but considerable dispersion in other
industries. Id. at 28.
58. As an insurance industry study indicates, most sizable claims of the type that make
up federal court cases are pursued through the filing of a lawsuit. In a study of claims in
excess of $100,000 closed in 1985, only four percent of the claimants had not filed a lawsuit.
L. SouLAR, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUC LIABmtr CLAiMs CLosED uN 1985 (1986).
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product liability cases make up only two or three percent of the tort cases
in state courts. For example, a National Center for State Courts study
found that in one month in 1988 product liability made up 2.1% of tort
filings in twenty-four large urban trial courts. 59 That year product liability
60
cases were thirty-six percent of tort filings in the federal courts.
We can infer that a sizable portion of product liability litigation takes
place in the federal courts. The prominence of federal courts in the world
of product liability is shown by a General Accounting Office study that
examined product liability litigation for the years 1983 through 1985 in
five states. It found that forty-six percent of the cases tried to verdict were
tried in the federal courts. 6 1 It appears that federal courts are the site of
one third or more of all product liability litigation. 62 Since the federal
cases on the whole involve higher stakes, it is probable that most of the
money that is awarded in product liability cases is awarded in the federal
courts.
It is possible that while federal filings have been going down, state
filings have increased. Again, the available information is extremely
sketchy. The best account of the relation between federal and state filing
rates was an earlier study by the General Accounting Office, comparing
data on two products and on two states, concluding that "state court filings
matched federal court filings in the direction of change" and that there
was "a trend toward filing in federal court[s]. 63 I know of no reason to
believe that these observations are atypical or that this pattern has
59. David Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts:Evidence from the Trial CourtInformation Network, 14 STATE CT.J. 4, 8 (1990). In 1986, product liability cases were 2.3% of the tort
filings in the Florida courts. Donald G. Gifford, Litigation Trends in Rorida: Saga of a Growth
State, 39 U. FLAL. Ra,. 829, 849 (1987). That year product liability cases made up 27% of the
federal tort filings. A recent study of tort cases tried to verdict in 36 urban state trial courts
showed 3.4%. Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Does Plaintffand Defendant Status Matter? A
Comparison of Outcomes in Tort Litigation, National Center for State Courts (1991). Product
liability cases were 2.9% of tort filings in Iowa. Robert Tobin et. al., Iowa Tort Liability Study
(National Center For State Courts, 1986) (copy on file with the author).
60. It should be noted that these comparisons do not separate out asbestos cases, since
none of the state figures enable us to make such a separation-but if we restricted our count
only to non-asbestos product liability cases, these made up some twelve percent of all federal
tort filings in 1988.
61. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LwBiLrr. VERDICTs AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES (GAO/HRD-89-99). Asbestos cases were less than one percent of the
verdicts. Id. at 90. An earlier GAO study found that federal cases were thirty-two percent of
the product liability filings in Connecticut from 1979 to 1986 and twenty-two percent of those
filed in Iowa in three years from 1981 to 1985. U.S. GENERAL ACCOuNiNG OFFICE, PRODUCT
LkBxiur EXTENT OF "LIrAnONEXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED, 36-38 (GAO/
HRD-88-36BR) [hereinafter LrGATION ExpLosION].
62. Extrapolating from the 1988 Trial Court Information Network terminations, Professors Eisenberg and Henderson estimate that federal courts account for about thirty-nine percent of all product liability terminations. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Inside the Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 731, 739 (1992).
63. "We had sufficient data to compare trends in state courts and federal courts for cases
related to Dalkon Shield and Bendectin filed nationwide, all product liability cases filed in
Connecticut, and all product liability cases (other than those related to contracts) in Iowa.
For all four sets of data, state court filings matched federal court filings in the direction of
change (that is, whether they increased or decreased), but not necessarily in the rate or
extent of growth. A trend toward filing in federal court was apparent." LrnGATION EXPLOSioN, supra note 61, at 32.
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changed and that filings in state courts are now moving in the opposite
direction from those in federal courts.
Two sets of figures compiled by the National Center of State Courts
confirm this impression. The first are figures for product liability filings in
courts in five states for varying periods since 1985 that reveal no general
upward trend or downward trend in state filings. 64 The second set of
figures traces separately the number of automobile torts and non-automobile torts filed in the courts of seven states from 1985 to 1990. Again, the
number of non-automobile torts, which includes all product liability cases,
is essentially flat, while the number of automobile torts increased over this
period. 65 Although the evidence is fragmentary, it provides no support
for the view that there has been a significant increase in product liability
filings in state courts.
In the federal courts, which have been the heartland of product liability litigation, there has been a significant decline in filings relevant to the
vast majority of companies. There is no evidence from which to conclude
that there has been an offsetting increase in product liability claims in
state courts. The decline in product liability filings fits together with a
number of other things that suggest that the world of product liability
claims is contracting rather than growing. First, Professors Henderson
and Eisenberg found that after the early 1980s plaintiffs were less successful at trial and defendants secured favorable opinions from courts in an
increasing portion of cases. 66 Second, Professors Rustad and Koenig, tracing the number of punitive damage awards in product liability cases in
both state and federal courts, discovered that there were many fewer punitive awards in product cases than is often assumed. They also found that
the number of punitive awards have followed the same pattern as federal
court filings. From the early 1980s (1981-85) to the late 1980s (1986-90),
the number of known punitive damage awards in asbestos cases increased
64. Communication from Dr. Brian Ostrom, Director, Court Statistics Project, National
Center for State Courts. The five states are Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
Ohio. These are the only states for which product liability is separated out from other tort
filings. These state figures include asbestos as well as other product liability cases. In four of
the five states the 1991 figure was lower than the first year in the series. In the fifth state,
Florida, a substantial 1991 increase (from 1300 in 1990 to 2472) was attributable to a batch of
1113 asbestos cases filed together by a single attorney.
65. The states in this compilation are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan and Texas. The seven-state total for non-automobile torts was:
1985 ............................................. 93,818
1986 ............................................. 103,514
1987 ............................................. 100,335
1988 ............................................. 98,438
1989 ............................................. 94,988
99,144
1990 .............................................
During this period automobile tort filings rose from 113,924 to 150,116. Figures supplied by
Dr. Brian Ostrom, Director, Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts.
66. James Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990). They adduce further evidence of these trends in Theodore Eisenberg &James Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L Rxv. 731 (1992). "[T]he major story in our data [is] the
steadily declining [plaintiff] success rates, the level median pretrial awards, and the post-1985
declines in awards, expected returns, and sums of awards... "Id. at 789.
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by 265% (from twenty to ninety-five); but known awards in non-asbestos
cases decreased thirty-four percent (from 119 to seventy-eight) in those
67
same years.
Third, there are not only fewer awards and fewer lawsuits; there are
fewer claims. A report by the General Accounting Office finds that the
number of claims per $100,000 of product liability premiums dropped
from 32.9 in 1984 to 17.1 in 1988, a forty-eight percent decrease. 68 Finally, a recent insurance industry study found that the rate of expansion of
paid claims under general liability coverage dropped from 21.1% annually
from 1978 to 1985 to 7.8% in the 1986-1990 period, a rate close to the rate
of growth in costs, such as medical care, which increased at a 7.5% rate
69
over the same period.
These studies depict a sustained contraction of product liability exposure rather than the runaway expansion that alarms adherents of the jaundiced view of civil justice. Apart from calling into question the supposed
mounting litigiousness of the American people, this contraction should
induce skepticism about the asserted role of product liability litigation in
undermining the competitiveness of Arnerican business.
It is possible that the civil justice system undermines the competitiveness of American business even though product liability is contracting.
Suppose that the burden imposed by the civil justice system is such that
even in this reduced state, it causes American industry to be less competitive. Is there any direct evidence of a connection? So far, serious investigation has found little evidence of any significant effect on America's
70
prosperity.
67. MIcHAEL RusTAD, DEMySTrFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LLmrfnry CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDITS (1991) This research was also presented in

Michael Rustad, In Defense of PunitiveDamages in ProductsLiability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With
EmpiricalData,78 IowA L. Ry. 1 (1992). See also, Product Liability, Hearingson S.640 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumerof the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 144-152 (1991) (statement of Michael Rustad, Professor of Law, Suffolk University
Law School).
The researchers compiled data on all punitive damage awards in product liability cases
on the basis of a search of "all available computer-based statistical sources, regional verdict
reporters, law review and other scholarly sources, state products liability practice guides, generalized case-reporting services, court records, asbestos reporters and media reports. In addition... all attorneys in reported cases were surveyed, to locate further cases." Id. at 146-47.
They located a total of 355 punitive damages verdicts in state and federal courts. Id.
Despite the admirable thoroughness of these researchers, no doubt they missed some
punitive damage awards. But since their method makes it more likely that cases would be
missing in the earlier period than in the later, the reliability of their non-asbestos trend data
is strengthened rather than weakened by the missing data.
68. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LTABiLrr?.

INSURANCE RATE LEVELS AND

CLAiM PAYMENTS DURING =a 1970s AND 1980s (GAO/HRD-91-108) (1991).
69. S. MooNEY, CRIsIs Am REcOvER. A REvIEw OF Busrmss LIaBmrY INSURANCE INTm
1980s 16 (1992).
70. Product liability and civil justice do not loom large in the general literature on competitiveness. In his 831 page opus, THE COMparrlvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS, Michael E.
Porter devotes less than half a page to product liability, observing that
A prominent example of an area where regulatory policy can work for or against
national advantage is product liability. Product liability laws can benefit competitive
advantage by acting like a sophisticated buyer to encourage the development of
better products.
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Reviewing the available data on the relation of liability to trade performance, Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution identified two major
lines of argument: (1) that liability adds to the cost of doing business, and
(2) that "[tihese costs, coupled with uncertainty over outcomes of tort litigation... [deter introduction of] new products or cost-saving production
71
technologies."
Litan concludes that it is difficult to know the magnitude of the net
cost of liability but estimates that "[a] t most that [cost] on average could be
as high as 2 percent of the cost of all products and services sold in the
United States. The effects on individual products could be much
greater."72 Although "it could affect the composition of United States
trade," he reports that "[i] t is highly unlikely that the 'liability tax,' however
large it is, materially or permanently affects the overall U.S. trade
78
balance."
Litan himself assembled data on the total "share of revenues [spent by
particular industries] devoted to paying for and avoiding 'risk.'"74 These
risk costs vary widely from industry to industry and they vary over time.
Notably, the overall expenditure on risk costs as a share of revenues dedined from a total of .58% (fifty-eight one-hundredths of one percent) of
total revenues for the whole set of industries in 1978 to .50% (fifty onehundredths of one percent) of total revenues in 1984.7 5 It should be recalled that the mid-1980's was just when non-asbestos product liability litigation was at its peak.
To see whether differences in risk cost can account for "any of the
cross industry variation in export performance" Litan tests the correlation
for "the seven industries for which both export and risk cost data are available" and finds no statistically significant relationship. 7 6 Litan observes
He continues, without providing any supporting evidence:
In the United States, however, product liability is so extreme and uncertain as to
retard innovation. The legal and regulatory climate places firms in constant jeopardy of costly and, as importantly, lengthy product liability suits. The existing approach goes beyond any reasonable need to protect consumers, as other nations
have demonstrated through more pragmatic approaches.
MicHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETrrrvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649 (1990). A 1991 report of

the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, analyzing the competitiveness of American manufacturing, doesn't even mention product liability. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH-

(OTAITE-498) (1991).
71. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance:Myths and RealNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPETING EcoNomsss: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE PACIFIC RIM,

ities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTr. COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WEL-

FARE 127, 128 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). Studies of the impact of liability in five industries
are in THE LAiLrrv MAZE: THE IMPACr OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFEry AND INNOVATION (Peter

W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., 1991).
72. See Litan, supra note 71 at 128-29. It is estimated, however, that all product liability
insurance premiums in 1991, adjusted to include self-insurance and other risk mechanisms,
added up to about .21 (twenty-one one-hundredths of one percent) of the total retail sales of
products in the United States in 1991. NATIONAL INSURANCE CONSUMER ORGANIZATION, PRODUCT LIABLrry. 1991 CALENDAR YEAR EXPERIENCE 3-4 (1992).

73. See Litan, supra note 71, at 128.
74. Id. at 140.

75. Id. at 141. The information is taken from the table on page 141. The data in the
table is misreported in the first full sentence of page 142.
76. Id. at 143.
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that "[i] t is not surprising that there is little connection between liability
costs and export performance by industry" since differences in risk costs
are "rather minor" and can easily be swamped by other effects, such as
changing energy costs. He notes, too, that "foreigners may be willing to
goods as a
pay for the added safety that may be built into U.S. produced
77
result of the deterrence features of our tort system."
Litan suggests that the effects on innovation "are potentially much
larger but much more uncertain" than the direct cost effects. 78 An analysis by Viscusi and Moore found that product liability actually had a positive
net effect on innovation:
This effect is not uniform and may reverse once the liability costs
become too great. At low product liability cost levels, increases in
liability costs foster innovation. Extremely high liability costs depress innovation once the disincentive effect on new product introductions becomes dominant. For industries with extremely
large liability costs.., the net effect of product liability is to depress innovation, whereas for the great majority of firms with
lower liability costs, it has a positive effect. 79
Litan examined the relation of research and development expenditures as a percentage of sales (a surrogate for innovation) for all United
States industries and for the four industries that were the target of the
largest number of federal product liability suits from 1974 to 1986. He
reports that the results:
[d]o not support the alleged innovation-liability link. R&D-tosales ratios for all industries increased rather substantially during
the 1980s ... significantly, that ratio more than doubled in the
drug industry, where product liability suits have been especially
prevalent. Both the industry-wide and pharmaceutical-specific
claims that liability fears have damptrends are inconsistent with
80
ened innovative activities.
Litan also refers to "[s]urvey evidence [that] suggests that the negative
effects [of the tort system] on innovation are significant." 8 1 Apparently he
is referring to a much-ballyhooed 1988 report of the Conference Board,
an item frequently used as a principal exhibit of the adverse effects of
product liability litigation. (For example it was put forth by the Council on
Competitiveness as its prime example of "the adverse effects of unconAmong the seven industries for which both export and risk cost data are available,
there is a small, but statistically insignificant, positive correlation between the
change in exports between 1978 and 1984 (either in absolute dollars or in percentage terms) and the change in the risk cost as a percentage of sales in those industries during this period. In other words, increases in risk costs tend to be associated
with an improvement in export performance, although again this effect is not statis-

tically significant.
Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 129.
79. W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, Rationalizingthe Relationship between Product
Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTERESr1, COMPETITION, INNOVATION
AND CONSUMER WELFRE 105, 123 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).

80. See lAtan, supra note 71, at 145-46.
81. Id. at 129.
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strained litigation.")82
It should be noted that there were two Conference Board surveys on
product liability that appeared in rapid succession in 1987 and 1988. The
first of these (the Weber report) was a survey of "the risk managers of 232
major U.S. corporations... each having a minimum annual sales revenue
of $100 million ... .a8 Written in November 1986-at the very height of
the furor about insurance coverage and cost 4-- the report took a cool,
detached view, totally rejecting the notion that there was a major liability
crisis. It reported its "most striking finding is that the impact of the liability
85
issue seems far more related to rhetoric than to reality."
For the major corporations surveyed, the pressures of product liability have hardly affected larger economic issues, such as
revenues, market share, or employee retention. Liability lawsuits,
which are indeed numerous, are overwhelmingly settled out of
court, and usually for sums that are considered modest by corporate standards. As a management function, product liability remains a part-time responsibility in most of the responding firms.
Where product liability has had a notable impact-where it has
most significantly affected management of decision making-has
been in the quality of the products themselves. Managers say
products have become safer, manufacturing procedures have
been improved, and labels and use instructions have become
more explicit.
The findings of the present survey also refute the general
contention of a severe and deepening crisis in tort liability and
insurance availability, at least for the nation's large corporations.
the general economy, likewise, is believed to have
The impact on
86
been minor.
Surprise with the sanguine response of the Weber respondents (and
of Weber) led the Conference Board to undertake "a broader look at
the effect of product liability on overall company operations" by surveying
the chief executive officers of the 2,000 largest manufacturing companies
and a sample of smaller manufacturers.8 7 The resulting report (the McGuire report) was issued in 1988. In contrast to the risk managers, the
CEO's had a very dark view of the liability situation. Forty-two percent
reported that the product liability system had a major impact on their
firms;8 8 forty-seven percent report that they had discontinued product
lines, thirty-nine percent that they had decided against introducing new
82.
83.

AGENDA, supra note 2, at 3.
NATHAN WEBER, PRODuar LIABILITY. THE CORPORATE RESPONSE REPORT No. 893

(1987).
84. Robert Hayden, The CulturalLogic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony, and the
GreatAmerican Liability InsuranceFamine of 1986, in 11 STuD. iN LAw, Po.. & Soc. 95 (1991).
85. See WEBER,supra note 83, at 2.
86. Id.
87. E. PATRIcK McGurRE, THE IMPACT oF PRODUCT LABnTY.REPORT No. 908 (1988).
88. Id. at 6.
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products; 8 9 and forty-nine percent reported a major impact on interna90
tional competitiveness.
How can we account for the startling discrepancy in perceptions revealed by these two surveys of corporate actors? The range of corporations
was slightly different: the risk manager survey included some service corporations as well as manufacturers; the CEO survey included small as well
as large corporations. Yet these do not seem to be the crucial factors. Both
surveys had very low response rates, 91 so one possibility is that they exercised contrasting selection effects, attracting sanguine :risk managers and
distressed CEOs respectively. Or perhaps they accurately reflected the
perspectives generated at different locations in the corporation. The CEO
figures probably represent sentiments that are widespread among American business executives. An early 1992 survey of executives by Business
Week found that sixty-two percent felt "that the U.S. civil justice system significantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to compete withJapanese
and European companies ... ."92 Of course these impressions are not in
themselves evidence of the existence or magnitude of these effects. But
they are part of the story. It is'entirely possible that this pessimism translates into lower expectations and less success. Which makes even more
remarkable the absence of independent evidence for the depressing
effects.

IV. THE MISSING

KNOWLEDGE BASE

In the end the competitiveness argument only restates the question of
the performance of the United States liability system-a question about
the net cost of the system and its benefits and about the costs and benefits
of the realistic alternatives. We are in the dark-not because there are a
few missing items of information, but because we do not have the needed
knowledge base. The most basic data about our civil justice system are not
collected systematically and cumulatively. That baseless fictions about the
number of lawyers, cursory surmises about the costs of the civil justice system, unfounded notions about product liability litigation and fables about
damaged competitiveness continue to be taken seriously testifies both to
the paucity of information and to a widespread disinclination to employ
the information we do have.
Why do we tolerate a knowledge base about the legal system that is so
thin and spotty? Compared to the economy or health care or education,
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 8.
91. The McGuire study received 270 usable responses from a mailing to the 2000 largest
U.S. manufacturing companies a-ad 280 responses from a separate mailing to 2000 smaller
manufacturers, for an overall rate of 13.8%. See McGumn, supra note 87, at ix-x. The Weber
study does not report its response rate. E. Patrick McGuire, who supervised the Weber study,
recalled that the response rate was about twenty percent. Telephone Interview with E. Patrick Maguire (Jan. 28, 1988).
92. The Verdict from the Corner Offle, Bus. W, April 13, 1992, at 66. This was a survey
conducted by Louis Harris & Associates Inc., in early 1992, of 400 senior executives at corporations drawn from the "Business Week Top 1000" companies. Id.
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research about legal processes, especially civil, is ludicrously thin; so thin
that it is perfectly routine for far-reaching policy proposals to be advanced
on the basis of tendentious macro-anecdotes and voodoo numbers. The
fund of basic information that we take for granted in discussions of the
economy, health care or education simply does not exist. To maintain
credibility in public debate about education or health or defense, participants have to critically take account of a shared fund of information. Players in the legal policy arena, however, can with impunity disregard reliable
information, make up dubious facts and repeat discredited fables. Anything goes, it seems.
The derelict state of the discourse about legal policy is surprising because lawyers, in their role as adversaries, are dogged in challenging and
dissecting evidence. But adversarial contention is not the same as delighting in employment of the most severe critical standards. And acuteness in
dealing with evidence and inference in specific cases does not necessarily
carry over to analysis of large social aggregates. For example, a careful
study showed that South Carolina lawyers were not much better than the
state's doctors in estimating the number, size, and patterns ofjury verdicts
93
in that state.
But what about our vast archipelago of law schools, whose professors
and students fill hundreds ofjournals with the products of legal scholarship? This great flood of scholarship does not provide an adequate knowledge base, because, basically, it is not interested in the working of the legal
system. Speaking of the "extraordinary imbalance in academic legal research," Judge Posner noted:
[A] n attitude of complete neglect to what is after all the great
story of American law in the modem era, and that is the extraordinary growth in the size of the profession since 1960 accompanied by an extraordinary increase in the volume of
litigation and other legal activities. We do not have in the academy a significant, cogent body of thinking
about why this had
94
occurred and what the consequences are.
We think of the contemporary legal academy as the inheritor of the
legal realist concern for the law in action, but the incorporation of legal
realist insights has been selective: legal scholarship fervently embraced the
critical deconstruction of texts,95 but remained diffident toward the inves96
tigative, empirical side of the realist legacy.
93. Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina:The Effect of EmpiricalResearch on Elite
Perceptions ConcerningJuy Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REv.585 (1988).
94. Richard A. Posner, The UncertainFuture of Legal Education, Address Before the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (January 15, 1991) p. 6.
95. Some have voiced alarm at the textual deconstruction that has become increasingly
fashionable in the law journals. But post-modern fashions have made such headway not because of their difference but because of their kinship with mainstream scholarship with
which they share the premise that the main thing is to achieve the right verbal formula, as if
words control reality.
96. The patron saint of this side of our legal heritage is Louis Brandeis, whose devotion
to disciplined exploration of the world and disdain for speculation uninformed by such inquiry is displayed in an episode recounted by biographer Philippa Strum:
Brandeis recalled having told [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes "that if he really
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Abetted by the bar, law schools have largely defaulted on their responsibility to contribute to knowledge about the working of the legal process.
It is as if we had a medical establishment consisting entirely of practicing
physicians and theoretical biologists, with no research institutions like the
National Institutes of Health and no public health monitoring facilities
like the Centers for Disease Controll
Overall, legal institutions, including the legal profession, invest very
little in research and development. No one knows how much. In 1987 the
income of the legal services industry, as the Census refers to us, was sixtyseven billion dollars-about one and a half percent of the Gross Domestic
Product. 97 That does not include expenditures for in-house law departments or government law departments or for courts or law schools. How
much is spent each year on research about civil justice? There is no data
from which a reliable estimate can be derived. From very partial data and
with very crude assumptions, I have constructed a "guesstimate" of something like sixty-six million dollars that surely errs on the side of generosity.98 That is less than one tenth of one percent of total expenditures on
legal institutions. And it is an even smaller fraction of the one hundred
fifty billion spent annually on research in this country.99
wanted to improve his mind" (as he always speaks of it) the way to do it is not to
read more philosophic books... but to get some sense of the world of fact. And he
asked me to map out some reading-he became much interested-and I told him
that I'd get some books, that books could carry him only so far, and that then he
should get some exhibits from life. I suggested the textile industry, and told him in
vacation time he is near Lawrence and Lowell and he should go there and look
about.
PHiPPA STRUM, Louis D. Bwinaxs: JusricE FOR THE PEonE 309-10 (1984). Holmes' response was that "Ihave little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to plunge into
them [facts] ...but I shrink from the bore." Id. at 310. Like Holmes, the legal academy has
followed the enchantments of text rather than the Brandeisian imperative of disciplined examination of context. So law journals religiously check accuracy of quotations, but tolerate
casual assertions about the state of the world.
97. U.S. CENsus OF SERvICE ImusriEs, LEGAL SERvicEs, tbl. 42 (1987).
98. This very rough estimate was constructed in the following way. Under my supervision, J.T. Knight collected the latest available annual research budgets of most of the most
prominent (to me) public and. private funders of research on civil justice. We obtained
figures for the FederalJudicial Center ($2.3 million), the National Science Foundation Program in Law and Social Science ($2.4 million), the National Center for Dispute Resolution
($0.8 million), the American Bar Foundation ($2.2 million), the National Center for State
Courts ($4.2 million), the Olin Foundation ($2.8 billion), the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation's Program in Conflict Resolution ($3.0 million), the Administrative Conference
of the United States (entire budget $1.9 million), RAND Institute for Civil Justice (entire
budget $2.3 million). The total for these nine institutions is $22.1 million. This total includes
the entire budget of several of these institutions; it is further exaggerated by the assumption
that all of this research is on civil justice and by the absence of any adjustment for the doublecounting that is involved when one of these institutions supports research by another.
I then make the extremely optimistic assumption that there is another set of non-university institutions, less visible to me, whose annual spending is equivalent to this extremely
optimistic total for civil justice research expenditures by these nine institutions. I then make
the further extravagantly optimistic assumption that in law schools and other university settings, there is a further equivalent expenditure on civil justice research that does not derive
from either of these two sets of institutions. (That this is heroically optimistic is indicated by
considering that $22 million would pay for well over two hundred full time equivalent senior
researchers.) With all these favorable assumptions, the total expenditure on civil justice research would be a bit more than $66 million.
99. NATIONAL Sc:mENc BoARD, ScmNcE AND ENGNEEmuNG INDICATORs Fig. 4-1 (1991).
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Lawyers have created in the civil justice system a powerful engine of
remedy and change, but display little sense of collective responsibility to
support the knowledge base needed to modify and wield it for public
good. Such a knowledge base will not provide definitive answers to questions of policy, for lawyers reflect the conflicting views of their clients, so
we should not imagine that we can come up with neutral and purely technical answers. Civil justice issues involve value choices-and that means
political choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can rescue us from a
debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts.
It is not only about our own legal system that we lack information.
Much of the denigration of our system is couched in misleading comparisons. Detractors ignore differences in the institutional setting and role of
legal institutions. Trends that are widespread throughout the industrialized world are treated as if they were peculiarly American and, moreover,
manifested pathological flaws in American society. Recent decades have
witnessed a dramatic worldwide legalization of social life, including an increase in litigation and in the number of lawyers-even in Japan, which is
so often falsely portrayed as a land without litigation and lawyers. As
globalization proceeds, the legal systems of various countries will interact
more intensively. We need to develop a reliable knowledge base that will
enable us to make meaningful cross-national comparisons as well as track
developments in our own legal system.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of our legal system, it is worth recalling that one realm in which the United States has remained the leading
exporter is what we may call the technology of doing law-constitutionalism, judicial enforcement of rights, the organization of law firms, alternative dispute resolution and public interest law. For all their admitted flaws,
American institutions provide influential models for the governance of
business relations, the processing of disputes, and the protection of
citizens.
The legal system that we inhabit is expanding rapidly and is being
reshaped by both new technologies within, and the demands of a changing world without. The legal system is one of the mechanisms by which
society monitors and regulates the world of incessant change. The efficacy
of the legal response depends not only on the quality of our knowledge
about the world, but on our understanding of the legal system as well.
The absence of an adequate knowledge base not only impairs the optimal
use of the legal system, but also makes the legal profession vulnerable to
attack.
The hostility toward lawyers so much in evidence today has much
deeper sources than the deficiencies of our knowledge base. It is deeply
rooted in society's fundamental ambivalence about law and is accentuated
by the discomforts of the increasing legalization of society. Our system of
civil justice is beset by many problems, particularly problems of securing
justice cheaply and expeditiously for all Americans. But we should be
mindful of the accomplishments as well as the discomforts. Increasingly,
ordinary people can use this system to hold to account society's managers
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and authorities. It is this "litigation up" that fuels the sense of outrage of
so many well-placed critics by challenging the leeways and immunities enjoyed by those in charge.
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APPENDIX

ESTIMATED LAWYER POPULATIONS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
MARC GALANTER AND

J.T. KNiGHT*

The following table summarizes the number of lawyers in all countries
for which usable data could be found. Data was unavailable for many
countries, including much of Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
Counting the number of lawyers in the world presents a difficult task
for several reasons. Not only is data unavailable for many countries, but
lawyers are defined differently from country to country. In some, there is
more than one professional group corresponding to the omnibus category
of lawyer used in the United States. Boundaries may be defined differently: in some places government legal officers, judges, prosecutors, law
teachers, and corporate law officers are considered "lawyers;" in others,
they are not. Totals from bar associations may be inflated or may exclude
non-members. Finally, it is difficult to account for retired lawyers and persons with the requisite educational credentials not presently working in
recognized "lawyer" jobs, who are included in some counts but not in
others.
To maximize temporal comparability, we have used data for 1985 or a
year as close as possible to 1985. Obviously, these enumerations vary in
reliability as well as in coverage. Where more than one estimate was available, all are given. If there is a basis for preferring one source on grounds
of reliability or inclusiveness, it is indicated by bold type.
COUNTRY

REPORTED

DATE

SOURCE

800

1983

A

Argentina

50,000

1983

A

Australia

23,000
21,640
7,068

1985
1985
1983

B
C
A

Austria

2,400
2,200
15,000
9,000

1987
1983
1984
1983

D
A
E
A

NUMBER OF
LAWYERS

Algeria

Bangladesh
Belgium

24,000
1984
F
21,104
1985
G
12,300
1983
A
(Source F is preferred because this source breaks down lawyers by
practice setting and includes government lawyers, judges, etc.)
* J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1993; Clerk to Magistrate Stephen Crocker, U.S.
District Court (W.D. Wis.), 1993-94.
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Brazil

168,245
1980
H
85,716
1981
G
500,000
1989
I
(Source I is not used in any estimate because this unconfirmed figure is
improbably large. See note 10, supra.)
42,710
1986
J
40,000
1983
A
34,205
1985
G
32,500
1990
K
(Source J is preferred because this source provides comprehensive
analysis of law practice in Canada including lawyers and notaries.)
Canada

Chile

12,300

1983

A

China

47,461
1990
L
30,000
1985-88
M
(Source L is preferred because this source distinguishes by types of
practice)
Costa Rica

1,959

1983

A

Denmark

3,000

1983

A

Egypt
30,000
1983
N
(Source N refers to members of the Egyptian Bar Association.)
England &
Wales

51,857

1985

0

45,500
1985
(Both sources include both solicitors and barristers.)

P

Finland

B
A

10,614
9,000

1983
1983

27,700
1990
G
27,215
1983
A
26,029
1983
Q
(Sources G and A include lawyers in private practice only. Figure
excludes notaries and bailiffs.)

France

Germany

2,035

1990

Q

P

(East)
(Source P includes private practice and judges.)
Germany
(West)

116,000

1985

101,700
1984
S
47,359
1985
G
43,100
1983
A
(Source R is preferred because this source is inclusive of all practice
settings.)
Hong Kong

1,800
1,332

1989
1983

T
A
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India

247,373
1983
U
225,000
1983
A
(Source U is information obtained from regional bar councils, including
members of the Bar Council of India)
Ireland

2,500

1983

A

Israel

7,500

1983

A

Italy

46,600
1983
A
46,401
1985
G
32,468
1982
V
(Sources A, G and V include lawyers in private practice only.)

Japan

124,000
122,000
100,000
95,342

1989
1980
1987
1982

W
x
Y
z

Jordan

700

1983

A

Kenya

1,000

1991

AA

Malaysia

2,600

1988

BB

Nepal

1,000

1983

A

Netherlands

5,124
4,000
4,149

1986
1983
1981

CC
A
DD

4,149

1981

K

2,000

1983

A

New Zealand

Nigeria
Norway

6,572
1980
EE
4,412
1970
G
2,100
1983
A
(Source G is preferred because this source includes all practice
settings.)
Pakistan

70,000
22,000

1982
1983

FF
A

Panama

900

1983

A

Scotland

7,270
1982-84
GG
6,350
1985
G
(Sources GG and G include solicitors, advocates in private practice and
government lawyers)
Singapore

990

1983

South Africa
5,700
1986
(The data for Source HH is incomplete.)
Spain

A
HH

55,000
1983
A
34,234
1985
B
42,000
1982
II
(Source B is preferred because this source includes judges and
government lawyers.)
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1964
2,064
Sweden
(Source B includes private practice and government.)
Switzerland
Turkey
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B

3,688
3,300

1980
1983

.3
A

22,395
18,000

1987
1983

P
A

KK
1985
655,191
LL
1985
618,800
(Source KK is preferred because this source is an authoritative count
enumerating lawyers by practice setting.)
United States

U.S.S.R
Uruguay
Venezuela

207,000
100,000

1986
1989

MM
NN

300

1983

A

31,400
15,000

1990
1980

K (at n.7)
00
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CALCUILATION OF UNITED
STATES' SHARE OF WORLD'S LAWYERS

Methodology of Calculations. The average of all available figures for each
country is used except in cases where one seems clearly preferable. "Best
available" figures are indicated in bold because those sources provide
more specificity about the nature of law practice in a particular country,
and/or provide a better basis for comparative analysis.
The average of available figures is calculated by dividing the sum of all
figures available for a particular country by the number of sources. The
"highest" estimate is calculated by using the highest reported figure for
each country. The "lowest" estimate is calculated by using the lowest reported figure for each country.
For all estimates, the figure taken from source KK is the only United
States estimate used. In all calculations, the figure taken from source I
(for Brazil) is excluded.
ESTIMATE A.
NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON BEST AVAILABLE
FIGURES REPORTED
Total lawyers .......... 1,908,844 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S ....... 34.3% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
Where there are multiple sources and none is preferred, computation is
on the basis of the average of available figures.

ESTIMATE B.

NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
AVERAGE FIGURES REPORTED

Total lawyers .......... 1,851,588 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total lawyers in the U.S ....... 35.4% (without adjustment for
unreported countries)
In all cases (other than the U.S.) where there are multiple sources, computation is based on the average of available sources.

ESTIMATE C.

NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
HIGHEST FIGURES REPORTED

Total lawyers .......... 2,065,838 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S ....... 31.7% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
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ESTIMATE D.
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NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
LOWEST FIGURES REPORTED

Total lawyers .......... 1,646,573 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S. 39.8% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
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